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Motivated by recent cartel practices, a stable collusive agreement is charac-
terized when ﬁrms’ prices and quantities are private information. Conditions are
derived whereby an equilibrium exists in which ﬁrms truthfully report their sales
and then make transfers within the cartel based on these reports. The proper-
ties of this equilibrium ﬁt well with the cartel agreements used in a number of
markets including citric acid, lysine, and vitamins.
1I n t r o d u c t i o n
1.1 Some Recent Cartels
1.1.1 Lysine
Lysine is added to livestock feed to develop body tissue in pigs and poultry. In the
early 1990s, the ﬁve major lysine producers formed a global cartel which lasted until
mid 1995. Though two of the ﬁrms - Ajinomoto and Sewon - recommended collud-
ing through the allocation of exclusive geographic markets, Archer Daniel Midlands
pushed for and succeeded in having accepted a sales quota scheme whereby each ﬁrm
was entitled to a certain level of output. The agreed-upon allocation for 1992 for the
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1global and European markets is shown in Table 1.1
Table 1 - Lysine Market Allocation (1992, tons)
Company Global Europe
Ajinomoto 73,500 34,000




To monitor compliance, Kanji Mimoto of Ajinomoto was assigned the task of
preparing monthly "scorecards" for the cartel. Each company telephoned or mailed
their sales volumes to Mimoto, who then prepared a spreadsheet that was distributed
at the quarterly meetings of the cartel. To promote compliance, "guaranteed buy-
ins" were used: A company which sold more than its quota had to buy output from
producers who were below quota.
There were isolated reports of cartel members under-reporting their sales in order
to avoid the punishment associated with guaranteed buy-ins. For example, Cheil
claimed to the European Commission that it provided "misleading" sales information
to the other companies, while Ajinomoto hid 3,500 tons of lysine from the cartel’s
auditors; an internal memo read: "Hide 1,000 tons in Thailand internal business."
Nevertheless, the collusive agreement was largely successful.
1.1.2 Citric Acid
Citric acid is primarily used in the food and beverage industry, but is also an ingredi-
ent in household cleaning products, pharmaceuticals, and cosmetics as well as having
some industrial uses. From early 1991 to mid 1995, the ﬁve largest producers of citric
acid operated a cartel. At the time they made up about 60% of global production
and 67% of production in the European Union. A sales quota scheme was established
in terms of market shares. Reported in Table 2, these market shares were based on
the average of the previous three years’ sales.
Table 2 - Citric Acid Market Allocation (1991)
Company Market Share
Haarman & Reimer 32.0%




As with the lysine cartel, the market allocation was monitored through the report-
ing of sales. On a monthly basis, each company reported its sales to an executive of
1All ensuing facts in Section 1 are from European Commission decisions and can be found in
Harrington (2006).
2Hoﬀmann LaRoche. The data was then assembled and reported back to the members
by telephone. To provide some external validity, the reported sales were checked by
independent Swiss auditors. Enforcement was through a "buy-back system" whereby
a company that exceeded its assigned quota in any one year was obliged to purchase
product from the companies with sales below their quota in the following year. For
example, at a cartel meeting in November 1991, it was determined that Haarmann &
Reimer needed to buy 7,000 tons of citric acid from ADM and it seemed the purchase
was later made. In terms of eﬃcacy, actual production by each member adhered very
closely to the cartel’s planned production.
1.1.3 General Properties of Recent Cartels
There are a number of properties common to the citric acid and lysine cartels that we
would like to highlight. First note that demand in these markets came from industrial
buyers, with price typically being set bilaterally between a seller and a buyer. This
meant that price, along with ﬁrm sales, were not public information. Second, the
collusive agreement was in terms of an allocation of sales, and not just coordination
on a common price. Third, the collusive agreement was monitored by comparing
sales to the agreed-upon quotas. Fourth, monitoring used self-reported sales which,
on the whole, were not veriﬁable. Fifth, the collusive agreement was (at least partly)
enforced through a transfer scheme whereby ﬁrms which reported sales above their
quota eﬀectively made a payment (through inter-ﬁrm purchases) to those ﬁrms who
reported sales below their quota.
These properties are not unique to the citric acid and lysine cartels. The setting of
sales quotas with monitoring in terms of reported sales was also a practice deployed
by cartels in the markets for carbonless paper, choline chloride, copper plumbing
tubes, graphite electrodes, plasterboard, vitamins, and zinc phosphate. For example,
from the European Commission decision on the vitamins cartel: "The purpose of
the quarterly meetings was to monitor achieved market shares against quota and
to adjust sales levels to comply with the agreed allocations."2 And for the graphite
electrodes cartel:3
For the purpose of formalising the exchange of volume information and
making the collection of data more eﬃcient, SGL proposed at the “Top
Guy” meeting in Tokyo in February 1995 the adoption of a “Central
Monitoring System”. Tokai was designated by the cartel to collect the
data from the Japanese producers, UCAR and SGL.
The accuracy of reported sales was established ex post for the carbonless paper
cartel: "Comparison of these ﬁgures with information on real sales ﬁgures conﬁrms
2Quoting from the European Commission decision for the vitamin B2 cartel (Harrington, 2006,
p. 47).
3Quoting from the European Commission decision for the graphite electrodes cartel (Harrington,
2006, p. 48).
3that the sales volume information exchanged at the meeting was accurate."4 Finally,
the use of a transfer scheme based upon reported sales was also documented for cartels
in choline chloride, organic peroxides, sodium gluconate, sorbates, vitamins, and zinc
phosphate. For example, for the choline chloride cartel "... it was understood that
Akzo Nobel and UCB could claim 35% and 28% respectively, while BASF would
have 15%. The principle was accepted that compensation should be provided if these
shares were exceeded."5
In fact, these collusive practices are not a recent phenomenon as they were present
in the International Steel Agreement of 1926. Collusion was between countries (not
companies) and an explicit (though not enforceable) contract was written up, from
which we quote.6 Sales quotas were ﬁxed according to Articles 3 and 4 and resulted
in the following allocation:
Table 3 - International Steel Agreement (1926)






Article 5 speciﬁed that monitoring would be in terms of sales: "Every month each
country’s actual net production of crude steel during that month shall be ascertained,
in relation to the ﬁgures indicated by the quotas." And in Articles 6 and 7, penalties
were speciﬁed in terms of monetary transfers between ﬁrms: "If the quarterly pro-
duction of a country exceeds the quota which was ﬁxed for it, that country shall pay
in respect of each ton in excess a ﬁne of 4 dollars, which shall accrue to the common
fund. ... If the production of any country has been below the quota allotted to it,
that country shall receive in compensation from the common fund the sum of two
dollars per ton short." Thus, the collusive practices observed in more recent years
have been in use for at least 80 years.
1.2 Research Objective
What the preceding summary of cartels reveals is that, when faced with colluding in
an environment in which prices and quantities are not easily observed, ﬁrms responded
with a similar design to their collusive agreement. Towards better understanding
hard core cartels, the primary objective of our research is to explain how these well-
documented collusive practices were eﬀective in sustaining collusion. What prevents
4Quoting from the European Commission decision for the carbonless paper cartel (Harrington,
2006, p. 51).
5Quoting from the European Commission decision for the choline chloride cartel (Harrington,
2006, p. 58).
6A copy of this agreement is in Appendix I of Plummer (1938). It is unclear what was the
geographic area to which the agreement applied - it may have just been the European continent -
since it did not encompass all countries that were producing steel at that time.
4ﬁrms from undercutting the collusive price and then under-reporting their sales?
How can cartel members be induced to truthfully report their sales when higher
sales reports require providing compensation to other members? We show that, if
market demand is not too volatile, an equilibrium exists in which ﬁrms truthfully
report their sales and set collusive prices, with asymmetric punishments that could
be implemented using guaranteed buy-ins or buy-backs. Thus, observed collusive
practices ﬁt quite well within the equilibrium framework.
Having provided an explanation of observed cartel behavior, a second task is to
explore the structure of optimal equilibria when prices and quantities are private
information. While observed collusive agreements were eﬀective, are there other
designs which would generate higher cartel proﬁts? For a simple demand setting,
this question is addressed using a mechanism design approach. Optimal equilibria
are found to have properties consistent with those of our equilibrium which suggests
that these cartels have found a winning design, and thus could explain why it is so
widespread.
Our informational setting - in which the history of actions is private information
- is not new to the repeated game literature, and various Folk Theorems have been
derived. A review of that work is provided in Appendix A where we explain that
previous models are either inappropriate for the oligopoly setting and/or characterize
an equilibrium that does not conform with collusive practices. While the oligopoly
g a m ew ee x a m i n ei sn o tam e m b e ro ft h ec l a s sof games considered in those papers,7
the more crucial distinction is in terms of objectives. The focus of previous work on
private monitoring is characterizing the set of equilibrium payoﬀs. In contrast, we
want to explain observed collusive agreements by constructing an empirically valid
equilibrium which sustains collusion when ﬁrms do not publicly observe prices or
quantities.8
The model is described in Section 2 and, as a benchmark, the static Nash equi-
librium is characterized in Section 3. The main result is in Section 4 where we show
that, under certain demand conditions, collusion can be sustained even when prices
and sales are private information. Section 5 focuses on the special case when market
demand can take 0, 1, or 2 units and characterizes an optimal collusive equilibrium.
Section 6 concludes.
2M o d e l
There are n ≥ 2 ﬁr m sw h o ,i ne a c hp e r i o do fa ni n ﬁnite horizon setting, simultane-
ously choose price from a compact set, after which each ﬁrm’s sales are stochastically
determined. (As is typical, it is assumed that a ﬁrm supplies to meet demand.)
The stochastic realization for period t is composed of total demand, mt, and an
allocation of that demand described by a vector of ﬁrms’ quantities, qt.M a r k e td e -
7At a minimum, our action space is inﬁnite - ﬁrms can choose any non-negative price - while
previous work (excluding Aoyagi, 2002) assumes a ﬁnite action space.
8Our objective is then the same as Graham and Marshall (1987) who seek to explain observed
collusive practices in auctions.
5mand is integer-valued and lies in the ﬁnite set Γ ≡ {m,m+1 ,...,m − 1,m}, where
0 ≤ m < m and m is ﬁnite. Let ρ : Γ → [0,1] be a probability function where ρ(m)





as the average market sales. Note that market demand does not depend on ﬁrms’
prices. While ﬁrm demand will be sensitive to price, market demand is perfectly
inelastic.9 Firms have a common constant marginal cost of c.
An individual ﬁrm’s demand has support {0,1,...,q} where q is ﬁnite and, of





denote the probability that the quantity vector is q =
{q1,...q n}, given price vector p = {p1,...p n} and market demand m.T o f o c u s o n
symmetric equilibria, we assume that the probability distribution Ψ of how the market






























be the probability function on ﬁrm i’s sales given total de-




















Two conditions are required of σi (which implicitly places conditions on ρ and ψi).
A2 speciﬁes that a ﬁrm always assigns positive probability to demand equalling its
maximum value, which is weaker than assuming σi has full support. A3 assumes that






> 0, ∀q, ∀p.










9While we make this assumption for purposes of tractability, it is reasonable for many of the
cartels mentioned in the Introduction; for example, the choline chloride, citric acid, lysine, and
vitamins cartels. These products are inputs in a downstream product and thus their demand is
derived demand. Since the input makes up a very small percentage of the downstream product’s
cost of production, market demand will generally be insensitive to price for a wide range of prices.
10A2 and A3 hold, for example, when Ψ is derived from a binomial distribution; that is, each of m
customers independently choose from which ﬁrm to buy. A proof is available from the authors upon
request.
6The setting is an inﬁnitely repeated game in which, in each period, ﬁrms choose
price and then stochastic demand is realized. Let δ be the common discount factor and
assume a ﬁrm acts to maximize the expected present value of its proﬁts t r e a m .E a c h
ﬁrm’s price and realized sales are private information. This structure is augmented
by allowing ﬁrms to make public messages and conduct monetary transfers. The
sequence of decisions and events is described below.
Stage 1 (price) Each ﬁrm chooses a non-negative price.
Stage 2 (sales) With prices being private information, each ﬁrm learns its sales.
Stage 3 (report) With prices and sales being private information, ﬁrms simultane-
ously submit publicly observed costless messages from the set {∅,0,1,...,q}
where ∅ means providing no message. (A message is to be interpreted as a
sales report).11
Stage 4 (transfer) With prices and quantities being private information and re-
ports being public information, each ﬁrm makes a publicly observed non-negative
payment which is divided equally among the other n − 1 ﬁrms.
To place this model in perspective, the problem we are tackling is one of collusion
with imperfect monitoring, which originated with Stigler (1964) and was ﬁrst formally
treated in a game-theoretic setting by Green and Porter (1984). With the latter
treatment, which has become the standard approach, ﬁrms choose quantities in a
homogeneous goods industry with price being determined by those quantities and
an unobserved demand shock. Firms’ quantities are private information, while price
is a public signal. In contrast, we assume both prices and quantities are private
information in the context of a price-setting game. More closely related is our earlier
work (Harrington and Skrzypacz, 2007), from which the current paper diﬀers in
three ways. First, ﬁrms’ quantities are private information, which is at the heart of
the problem we’re addressing here. Second, market demand is stochastic, which is
empirically compelling and required to make the problem interesting (this is explained
in Section 4). Third, each ﬁrm sets a single price for all customers instead of a
customer-speciﬁc price. This third assumption appears to be more for convenience
though a more careful assessment of that claim is needed.12
11This speciﬁcation modestly departs from actual cartel practices. For example, the citric acid car-
tel had Haarman & Reimer, ADM, Jungbunzlauer, and Cerestar simultaneously submit sales reports
to Hoﬀm a nL a R o c h e ,a f t e rw h i c hH o ﬀman LaRoche added its sales report and then disseminated
all of the reports. This meant that Hoﬀman LaRoche submitted its sales report after learning the
reports of the other four cartel members.
12Also related is Marshall and Marx (2008). They assume that any deviation in price is perfectly
identiﬁed from ﬁrms’ market shares, while we assume that market shares are subject to shocks and
thus there is imperfect monitoring.
73 Static Nash Equilibrium
Before considering the inﬁnitely repeated setting, let’s establish the non-collusive

















for all qi and "·"
is the dot product.
Let pN (c) denote a symmetric Nash equilibrium.
pN (c) ∈ argmax
m X
m=m




We will assume the demand structure allows for a symmetric Nash equilibrium for
the static game, as speciﬁed in Assumption A4:
A4 T h es t a t i cg a m ew i t hc o s tc has, ∀c ≥ 0, a symmetric Nash equilibrium price
pN (c) that is increasing, continuous, and unbounded in c.




depends only on pair-
wise price diﬀerences, which can be derived from a model of consumer choice with
quasi-linear preferences in money; ii) the ﬁrst-order condition (FOC) is suﬃcient to




is interior for any equi-
librium prices. Indeed, as we show in Appendix B, under these conditions a ﬁrm’s
equilibrium price equals its cost plus a constant, which satisﬁes A4.
4 Sustaining Collusive Outcomes
Before moving on to the main result, let us ﬁrst note that sustaining collusion is
trivial when market demand is common knowledge, either because it is ﬁxed or is
stochastic but observed. For suppose it is common knowledge that market demand
is m0.I f ﬁrm i expects the other ﬁrms to make truthful sales reports then ﬁrm
i knows that if its report is inaccurate then total reported sales will diﬀer from
m0. Though the other ﬁrms will not know who delivered a misleading sales report,
it will be common knowledge among them that someone did. Thus, if there is a
(common) punishment when total reported sales diﬀer from m0, ﬁrms can be induced
to report truthfully if they are suﬃciently patient. Once ﬁrmed are motivated to
report truthfully, the collusive scheme presented in Harrington and Skrzypacz (2007)
can sustain collusion.13 We then assume market demand is stochastic and unobserved.
Consider a symmetric strategy proﬁle in which there are two phases: collusive
and non-collusive. Suppose the industry is in the collusive phase in period t.D u r i n g
13This collusive scheme is described in the proof of Theorem 1, as we deploy it here as well.
8the price stage, the strategy has a ﬁrm set the collusive price. After ﬁrm i learns its
sales - which is denoted qt
i - it then truthfully reports those sales. If all ﬁrms have
submitted reports then ﬁrm i pays zrt
i to the other ﬁrms where rt
i was the ﬁrm’s sales
report in the previous stage (in equilibrium, rt
i = qt
i). If all ﬁrms make their payments
then there is a public randomization device which determines whether the industry
remains in the collusive phase or shifts to the non-collusive phase. The probability
function for shifting to the non-collusive phase is denoted φ : {0,1,2,...} → [0,1].I f
some ﬁrm does not submit a report or failed to make the appropriate payment then
the industry shifts to the non-collusive phase. Once an industry is in the non-collusive
phase, ﬁrms price according to the static Nash equilibrium, don’t make reports, and
don’t make payments. This strategy proﬁle we refer to as the lysine strategy proﬁle
and is summarized below for ﬁrm i.
• In the price stage:
— if in the collusive phase then price at b p
— if in the non-collusive phase then price at pN
• In the report stage:
— if in the collusive phase then report qt
i
— if in the non-collusive phase then do not report
• In the transfer stage:
— if in the collusive phase,
∗ and all ﬁrms reported then make a payment of rt
iz (which is then
equally divided among the other n − 1 ﬁrms).
∗ and one or more ﬁrms did not report then make a zero payment
— if in the non-collusive phase then make a zero payment
• In the transition stage (public randomization device):
— if in the collusive phase,
∗ all ﬁrms reported and xt
j = rt
jz ∀j (where xt
j is ﬁrm j’s payment), then










∗ otherwise, go to the non-collusive phase with probability one
— if in the non-collusive phase then remain in the non-collusive phase with
probability one.
9The lysine strategy proﬁle ﬁts reasonably well recent collusive practices in mar-
kets such as citric acid, lysine, and vitamins. For when ﬁrms’ prices and quantities
are private information - an appropriate feature of those markets - the cartel moni-
tors the agreement by having ﬁrms report their sales, and then punish for reported
over-production by having monetary transfers move from over-producers to under-
producers. In practice, these transfers were performed through inter-ﬁrm sales which,
as long as price exceeds cost, act like monetary transfers. (Unfortunately, we lack doc-
umentation regarding the price of inter-ﬁrm sales.) A desirable feature of performing
transfers in this manner is that they did not create suspicions since inter-ﬁrm sales
were a common competitive feature of these markets. The one feature of the lysine
strategy proﬁle that is not expressly referred to in the documentation of these cases is
the conditions under which the cartel collapses. The lysine strategy proﬁle speciﬁes
that the probability of collusion stopping depends on ﬁrms’ sales reports, as well as
whether the requisite payments were made. In practice, evidence is scarce that such
contingencies are expressly discussed by cartel members; even the 1926 International
Steel Agreement did not specify in the contract what would happen if a ﬁrm did
not pay the required $4 for each ton above its quota. Our working assumption is
that implicit in any collusive agreement is that egregious behavior - not making the
requisite payment, incredible sales reports, and the like - risks causing the cartel to
collapse.
Theorem 1 provides suﬃcient conditions whereby the lysine strategy proﬁle is a
semi-public perfect equilibrium, which is a sequential equilibrium satisfying certain
properties. Deﬁned and used in Compte (1998), this solution concept has actions
depend only on the public history, and messages depend only on the public history
and the most recent private history.14 In our setting, this means that prices and
payments depend only on the public history of past reports and payments, while a
ﬁrm’s report depends only on the public history of reports and payments and the
private information composed of the ﬁrm’s price and sales in the current period.
Given a condition on the volatility of market demand, Theorem 1 shows that col-
lusive outcomes are sustainable when ﬁrms are suﬃciently patient. More speciﬁcally,
if ﬁrms are suﬃciently patient and (1) holds then a collusive price b p is supportable
using the lysine strategy proﬁle and, in addition, the probability of transiting to the
non-collusive phase is arbitrarily small. In interpreting (1), recall that m is the max-
imal value of market demand and μ is average market demand. As pN−1
(·) is the
inverse of the static Nash equilibrium price function, then pN−1
(b p) is the marginal
cost for which the static Nash equilibrium price equals b p.S i n c e b p>p N (c),t h e n
pN−1
(b p) − c>0. (1) will hold if ρ(·) puts suﬃcient mass on maximal demand so
that average demand is close to maximal demand.15 Thus, Theorem 1 shows that if
demand is not "too stochastic" - in the restricted sense that average demand is not
too much lower than maximal demand - then collusion can be sustained when ﬁrms
are suﬃciently patient. Proofs are in Appendix C.
14To be more exact, messages depend on the private history since the last period in which messages
were informative. Compte (1998) considered equilibria in which there was delay in the sending of
informative messages. In the equilibrium we characterize, there is no delay.
15Given that the lhs of (1) is unbounded as μ → m and the rhs is bounded then (1) is satisﬁed.







(b p) − c
i
b p − pN (1)
then the lysine strategy proﬁle is a semi-public perfect equilibrium and
max{φ(m):m ≤ m ≤ m} <ε .
If we impose the additional structure on demand used in Appendix B to deliver
pN (c)=c + const (namely, that consumers have quasi-linear preferences in money)




In that case, Theorem 1 can be re-stated as:16
Corollary 2 Suppose pN(c)=c + const. If
μ
m−μ >n− 1 then for any b p>p N and
ε>0, there exists δ < 1 such that if δ>δthen the lysine strategy proﬁle is a
semi-public perfect equilibrium with max{φ(m):m ≤ m ≤ m} <ε .
Given ﬁrms truthfully report their sales, the mechanism used to sustain a collusive
price is the same as in Harrington and Skrzypacz (2007). For each unit that a ﬁrm
sells (and reports), it makes a payment of z to the other cartel members. Thus,
when a ﬁrm sells a unit rather than have the unit sold by another ﬁrm, it ends up
paying z rather than receiving z





z. This means that a





z.A saﬁrm’s price only impacts its current
proﬁt and its net transfer - but not its future payoﬀ - the equilibrium (collusive) price






z. A higher collusive price can then be sustained by setting a higher per
unit transfer.
The preceding argument rests on a ﬁrm truthfully reporting its sales, and there
is clearly an incentive to under-report since doing so reduces the required payment
to other ﬁrms. The collusive mechanism oﬀsets this temptation to under-report by
making it more likely that the cartel breaks down when the aggregate sales report is
smaller.17 Speciﬁcally, we use the following speciﬁcation in the proof of Theorem 1:
φ(m)=
½




16In a proof that is available on request, it has been shown that the binomial case satisﬁes A3 and,
therefore, satisﬁes A1-A4.
17While we have speciﬁed a punishment of inﬁnite reversion to the stage game Nash equilibrium,
this collusive mechanism will also work with ﬁnite reversion in which case there are periodic price
wars.









μ(b p − pN (c)) − (n − 1)
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This probability of cartel breakdown (see Figure 1) is decreasing and linear for
equilibrium values of the aggregate sales report. Thus, under-reporting is discour-
aged because a lower sales report is more likely to cause collusion to end. However,
in counter-acting the incentive to under-report, one could create an incentive to over-
report;aﬁrm reports higher sales and makes a higher payment in order to reduce
the likelihood of cartel collapse. Here, we use the fact that an over-report results in
reported market sales taking on, with positive probability, a non-equilibrium value
(that is, in excess of maximal demand m). While the probability of a price war is
decreasing in total reported sales for equilibrium values of total demand, the proba-
bility of a price war is higher when total reported sales exceeds maximal demand (at
least when δ → 1). Firms then do not want to over-report sales either.19 Finally, as a
positive probability of collusion ending is needed to induce ﬁrms to truthfully report
their sales, there is an ineﬃciency. However, the probability of cartel breakdown goes
to zero as δ → 1.
To explain the source of the restriction in (1), we need to examine the following
incentive compatibility constraint (ICC):
δ
¡







[φ(m − 1) − φ(m)] ≥ z. (5)
This ICC ensures it is optimal to report truthfully than to under-report by one unit.
Under-reporting by one unit reduces ﬁrm 1’s payment to other ﬁrms by z,w h i c hi st h e
rhs of (5). The lhs is the expected reduction in the future payoﬀ from reporting q−1
rather than q. The probability of cartel breakdown is increased by φ(m − 1)−φ(m)
(when the market demand realization is m) and the foregone future payoﬀ due to
cartel breakdown is V −V N where V is the collusive value and V N is the non-collusive
value. In the proof of Theorem 1, it is shown that (5) is the binding ICC and is the
source of (1).20
To show how (1) implies (5), ﬁrst note that
18Note that the lower bound on β in (4) is bounded with respect to δ w h i c hm e a n sw ec a ne n s u r e
φ(m) < 1 as δ → 1.
19In some situations, over-reporting may be deterred by requiring invoices for reported sales or a
customer list which could then be contacted. There is no analogous veriﬁcation process to detect
under-reporting because a ﬁrm could withhold invoices or deliver a subset of its true customer list.
In other words, evidence can be provided to prove that a sale was made but it is not possible to
provide evidence that a sale wasn’t made. This discussion suggests that the challenge is to provide
incentives to discourage under-reporting.
20It is established in the proof of Theorem 1 that, when φ is weakly convex, if it is not optimal to
under-report by one unit, then it is not optimal to under-report by any amount. Also, given (3), (5)
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in which case (1) is equivalent to
£




> m − μ. (6)
Since
V − V N =
£
b p − pN (c)
¤
(μ/n)




then the foregone loss from cartel breakdown is increasing in the collusive price b p,
and is decreasing in the probability of cartel breakdown,
Pm
m=m ρ(m)φ(m).A sb p is
increasing in the per unit transfer z, this argues for a higher value of z in order to raise
the average gain in proﬁt from maintaining collusion,
£
b p − pN (c)
¤
(μ/n).A tt h es a m e
time, z is the savings in the payment that a ﬁrm has to make when it under-reports
by one unit, in which case higher z also increases the incentive to under-report. What
is then needed is that
£
b p − pN (c)
¤
(μ/n) is large enough relative to z,w h i c hi sw h a t
(6) requires.21 A second key factor determining the size of V −V N is the probability






ρ(m)β (m − m)(1− δ)=β (m − μ)(1− δ). (8)
(8) needs to be suﬃciently small so that V − V N is suﬃciently large and, therefore,
(5) holds. Hence, m−μ must be small enough, as expressed in (6). In sum, sustaining
collusion requires that: i) the rise in the collusive price from a per unit transfer is
suﬃciently large relative to the size of the per unit transfer; and ii) the likelihood of
low demand is suﬃciently small so that cartel breakdown is not too likely.
Although it is possible that there is another equilibrium that relaxes the demand
condition in (1), the general intuition seems robust: Demand uncertainty combined
with the need to provide incentives to price high and report truthfully requires a
combination of transfers and value destruction. In particular, value destruction has
to be more likely when a ﬁrm reports no sales, for otherwise a ﬁrm could price low and
report it didn’t sell anything. Some ineﬃciency is then necessary with any collusive
scheme. However, if this ineﬃciency happens too often, value is destroyed to the
point that ﬁrms ﬁnd collusion unproﬁtable. As a result, if the probability of low
market demand states is too high, collusion is not feasible with semi-public collusive
schemes that do not involve delay in reporting.22 Consistent with this intuition, in
21When p






z and, therefore, z cancels
out in (6).
22If ﬁrms report sales with delay, that reduces the probability of there being no sales over the time
interval between meetings. Pooling periods then reduces the uncertainty in aggregate demand and
hence reduces the need for ineﬃcient punishments. This intuition originated with Abreu, Milgrom,
and Pearce (1991) and was later employed in Compte (1998) and others to prove Folk Theorems.
However, since individual sales are informative about the sales of other players, constructing equilibria
with delay in communication for general probability distributions over a ﬁrm’s sales is diﬃcult.
13the next section we provide an example whereby condition (1) is tight for semi-public
perfect equilibria without delay.
Finally, let us show that, as the period length becomes arbitrarily small, supra-
competitive proﬁts can be sustained using the lysine strategy proﬁle. Re-scaling by
1−δ, the normalized supracompetitive payoﬀ is (1 − δ)
¡
V − V N¢
. Substituting the
minimum value of β from (4), we derive:
(1 − δ)
¡





b p − pN (c)
¢
− nz (m − μ)
¤
.
Thus, (1 − δ)
¡
V − V N¢
> 0 i fa n do n l yi f
μ
£
b p − pN (c)
¤
− nz (m − μ) > 0,
which holds by (6).
In sum, we have shown that, when prices and quantities are private information,
ﬁrms can eﬀectively sustain collusion using the type of practices observed by recent
cartels in the markets for citric acid, lysine, and vitamins.
5 Optimal Mechanism for the Two Unit Demand Case
The previous section showed that observed collusive practices are consistent with
an equilibrium in which ﬁrms truthfully report their sales, make transfers to the
other ﬁrms based on those sales, and for which cartel breakdown is more likely when
aggregate reported sales is lower. We now turn to the objective of characterizing
an optimal collusive equilibrium. In particular, are there equilibria with a diﬀerent
structure that can sustain higher payoﬀs for cartel members? Or, have cartel members
discovered the most eﬀective collusive practices?
Taking a mechanism design approach to this question, we focus on a highly sim-
pliﬁed duopoly case when market demand can take on values of 0, 1 or 2.23 Reports
are restricted so that ri ∈ {0,1,2}. Let ρm ≡ ρ(m) be a shorthand for the probability
that demand is m ∈ {0,1,2},η i,j (p1,p 2) is the probability that q2 = j given q1 = i
and ﬁrms’ prices, and ψ (q1;m,p1,p 2) is the probability of ﬁr m1h a v i n gs a l e so fq1
given total demand is m and given ﬁrms’ prices.
To make the analysis tractable, we assume independence of the customers’ deci-
sions and a probability function that depends only on the diﬀerence in ﬁrms’ prices.
In particular, let the probability that any consumer buys from ﬁrm 1 be ξ (p2 − p1).
We assume ξ is a diﬀerentiable, increasing function and that ξ (0) = 1/2. Further-
more, ξ is such that, given the scheme we construct, the FOC of the price-setting
problem is suﬃcient for optimality; a suﬃcient condition is that ξ00 ≤ 0 .
23With some additional notation, we believe results can be extended in a straightforward manner
to when there are n ﬁrms.
14Using ξ and the independence of consumer choices we get:
ψ(1;1,p 1,p 2)=ξ (p2 − p1)
ψ(2;2,p 1,p 2)=ξ (p2 − p1)
2
ψ(1;2,p 1,p 2)=2 ξ (p2 − p1)[1− ξ (p2 − p1)].
ψ(0;2,p 1,p 2)=[ 1 − ξ (p2 − p1)]
2
A collusive mechanism consists of a recommended price pair (p1,p 2) and a transfer
rule that depends on reported sales. A transfer rule {t1 (r1,r 2), t2 (r2,r 1)} speciﬁes
net transfers received by the two players conditional on the reports. The mechanism
is feasible if
t1 (r1,r 2)+t2 (r2,r 1) ≤ 0,∀(r1,r 2). (9)
Moreover, we restrict the transfers to be bounded:
t1 (r1,r 2),t 2 (r2,r 1) ∈ [−x,x], ∀(r1,r 2), (10)
where x>0. Restriction (10) may be needed for the existence of an optimal mecha-
nism because total demand is inelastic. If bigger inter-ﬁrm transfers are more likely
to trigger an investigation by the antitrust authorities, cartel members may want to
put a bound on those transfers. Thus, the technical assumption in (10) may have an
economic rationale as well. The mechanism is incentive compatible if both ﬁrms ﬁnd
it optimal to set the recommended prices and report their realized sales truthfully.
A collusive mechanism is symmetric if t1 (r1,r 2)=t2 (r2,r 1)=t(r1,r 2) and
p1 = p2 = b p. Our goal is to describe an optimal symmetric incentive compatible
feasible collusive mechanism.
Anticipating that both ﬁrms will truthfully report their sales, ﬁrm 1’s expected
payoﬀ at the price stage is:
ρ0t(0,0) + ρ1 [ψ(1;1)(p1 − c + t(1,0)) + (1 − ψ(1;1))t(0,1)] (11)
+ρ2[ψ(2;2)(2(p1 − c)+t(2,0)) + ψ (1;2)(p1 − c + t(1,1)) + (ψ(0;2))t(0,2)],
where we have suppressed the dependence of ψ(·) on ﬁrms’ prices. The FOC for price
























Using our assumptions on ψ, this can be simpliﬁed to
0=ρ1
½







−ξ0 (0)[2(b p − c)+t(2,0) − t(0,2)] + 1
ª
.
15Solving it, the symmetric equilibrium price is:






[t(0,1) − t(1,0)] +
ρ2
ρ1 +2 ρ2
[t(0,2) − t(2,0)]. (14)
When t(0,1) − t(1,0) is higher, a ﬁrm beneﬁts more from being the ﬁrm with zero
demand when market demand is one. There is then an incentive for a ﬁrm to raise
price and that is why the equilibrium price is increasing in t(0,1)−t(1,0).As i m i l a r
logic explains why the equilibrium price is increasing in t(0,2) − t(2,0).
Let us consider the incentive compatibility constraints (ICCs) in the reporting
stage. Suppose q1 =2 , in which case ﬁrm 1 knows that ﬁrm 2 sold zero units. The
ICC for truthful reporting is
t(2,0) ≥ t(1,0),t(0,0). (15)
When q1 =1 , the ICCs for truthful reporting are
η1,1 (p1, b p)t(1,1)+
¡
1 − η1,1 (p1, b p)
¢
t(1,0) ≥ η1,1 (p1, b p)t(2,1)+
¡




η1,1 (p1, b p)t(1,1)+
¡
1 − η1,1 (p1, b p)
¢
t(1,0) ≥ η1,1 (p1, b p)t(0,1)+
¡




η1,1 (p1, b p) is the probability that ﬁrm 1 assigns to ﬁrm 2 selling one unit, given ﬁrm
1 sold one unit and the price pair. By (16), ﬁrm 1 prefers to report having sold one
unit than reporting two units; and by (17), ﬁrm 1 prefers to report having sold one
unit than reporting zero units. It is necessary for the mechanism to be incentive
compatible that (16) and (17) hold at p1 = b p. However, that is not suﬃcient, since
the ﬁrm may have a proﬁtable "double-deviation"; that is, deviating with price and
report. In our construction in the proof of Theorem 3, we use only these necessary
conditions and then verify that the ﬁrm has no incentive to misreport even if it
deviates in price as well. Finally, when q1 =0 , the ICCs are
η0,2 (p1, b p)t(0,2) + η0,1 (p1, b p)t(0,1) (18)
+
¡
1 − η0,2 (p1, b p) − η0,1 (p1, b p)
¢
t(0,0)
≥ η0,2 (p1, b p)t(1,2) + η0,1 (p1, b p)t(1,1)
+
¡
1 − η0,2 (p1, b p) − η0,1 (p1, b p)
¢
t(1,0)
η0,2 (p1, b p)t(0,2) + η0,1 (p1, b p)t(0,1) (19)
+
¡
1 − η0,2 (p1, b p) − η0,1 (p1, b p)
¢
t(0,0)
≥ η0,2 (p1, b p)t(2,2) + η0,1 (p1, b p)t(2,1)
+
¡
1 − η0,2 (p1, b p) − η0,1 (p1, b p)
¢
t(2,0)
(again it is necessary that these hold for p1 = b p, and suﬃcient if they hold for all p1).
16Substituting (14) into the expected payoﬀ in (11), the problem is to choose a
transfer function t(·) to maximize
ρ0t(0,0) + (ρ1/2)[t(1,0) + t(0,1)] (20)
+
µ
1 − ρ0 − ρ1
4
¶
[t(2,0) + 2t(1,1) + t(0,2)]
+
µ







[t(0,1) − t(1,0)] +
µ




subject to the feasibility constraints (9)-(10) and the ICCs (15)-(19).
Theorem 3 Under the assumptions of Section 5, if the high demand state is most
likely (ρ2 >ρ 0,ρ 1), an optimal symmetric mechanism is:
t(0,0) = −x
t(0,1) = 0,t(1,0) = −x
t(0,2) = x,t(2,0) = −x
t(1,1) = 0
t(r1,r 2)=−x if r1 + r2 > 2
and the resulting expected ﬁrm payoﬀ is:
µ
2(1− ρ0) − ρ1
4ξ0 (0)
¶
+( ρ2 − ρ0)x.
If the low demand state is most likely (ρ0 >ρ 1,ρ 2), there does not exist any sym-
metric mechanism yielding payoﬀs in excess of those produced by a stage game Nash
equilibrium.
When the low demand state is most likely, collusion cannot be sustained.24 We
do not have a characterization when the medium demand state is most likely (ρ1 >
ρ0,ρ 2).25 When the high demand state is most likely, collusion can be sustained and
the optimal mechanism has the following properties. When market demand is two
units and one ﬁrm sold both of those units, that ﬁrm is required to make a transfer
of x to the ﬁrm that sold nothing. When both ﬁrms sold one unit, there are no
transfers. When market demand is one unit, the ﬁrm having sold that unit incurs a
penalty of x and the other ﬁrm receives no payment, so value is destroyed. Finally,
when market demand is zero, both ﬁrms incur a penalty of x, and again there is an
ineﬃciency. The remainder of this section will explore this optimal mechanism; thus,
we will be assuming ρ2 >ρ 0,ρ 1.
24As earlier work on private monitoring suggests, delay in exchanging reports will presumably be
necessary to support collusion when ρ0 >ρ 1,ρ 2.
25When ρ1 >ρ 0,ρ 2, we can characterize an optimal mechanism when a ﬁrm deviates in its price
or in its reports, but a mechanism immune to deviating simultaneously in price and report has thus
far alluded us. The diﬃculty is in verifying that there are no proﬁtable double deviations.
17Let us ﬁrst show how this optimal mechanism can be implemented as a semi-public
perfect equilibrium of an inﬁnitely repeated game. Deﬁne
v ≡
µ
2(1− ρ0) − ρ1
4ξ0 (0)
¶
+( ρ2 − ρ0)x, vN ≡
µ
2(1− ρ0) − ρ1
4ξ0 (0)
¶
as the per period expected payoﬀ for the optimal mechanism and the stage Nash
equilibrium, respectively. When both ﬁrms report zero sales, each ﬁrm is supposed







, we then want to realize that penalty with a probability
such that the expected foregone value equals t(0,0). Hence, when (r1,r 2)=( 0 ,0),











δ (ρ2 − ρ0)
.
If (r1,r 2)=( 1 ,0) then ﬁrm 1 is to pay x and ﬁrm 2 has a zero transfer. To implement
it, assume ﬁrm 1 transfers x/2 to ﬁrm 2 and the probability the equilibrium shifts to











2δ (ρ2 − ρ0)
.
Thus, ﬁrm 1 incurs a penalty of x -a si tp a y sx/2 to ﬁrm 2 and incurs an expected
loss of x/2 from possible cartel breakdown - while ﬁrm 2 experiences no net transfer
as it receives x/2 from ﬁrm 2 but incurs an expected loss of x/2 from possible cartel
breakdown. Finally, if (r1,r 2)=( 2 ,0) then ﬁrm 1 simply transfers x to ﬁrm 2. This
strategy proﬁle implements the optimal mechanism and is an equilibrium iﬀ
1 − δ
δ (ρ2 − ρ0)




Note that the smaller is ρ2 − ρ0, the more patient ﬁrms have to be.





Substituting the transfer function from Theorem 3 into (14), the equilibrium price is




The equilibrium probability of cartel breakdown is
φ(r1 + r2)=
⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩
1−δ
δ(ρ2−ρ0) if r1 + r2 =0
1−δ
2δ(ρ2−ρ0) if r1 + r2 =1
0i f r1 + r2 =2
1−δ
δ(ρ2−ρ0) if r1 + r2 > 2
18and inter-ﬁrm payments are:





The properties of this optimal equilibrium match those of the lysine strategy
proﬁle quite closely. First, the payment scheme is linear in the number of units; a
ﬁrm transfers an amount x/2 to the other cartel member for each unit it reports
having sold. Of particular note is that payments depend only on a ﬁrm’s own sales
report. Second, the probability of cartel breakdown depends only on the aggregate




2δ (ρ2 − ρ0)
¸
(2 − r1 − r2).
The similarity between the optimal equilibrium and observed collusive practices sug-
gests that cartels have identiﬁed highly eﬀective methods for colluding when prices
and quantities are private information. The ubiquity of these practices may well be
due to the fact that there may not be practices which are more eﬃcacious.
6 Concluding Remarks
As it has been understood for a very long time, monitoring of a collusive agreement is
essential to its success. Only if ﬁrms can expect non-compliance to be observed and
punished will cartel members abide by the agreement to maintain high prices and limit
supply. In spite of the critical role of monitoring, there are many well-documented
episodes of successful collusion in markets for which there is limited public information
to use for the purposes of monitoring compliance. In environments for which prices
and sales are private information, it was frequently observed that collusion involved a
similar set of practices: ﬁrms self-report sales and conduct inter-ﬁrm transfers based
on those reports; speciﬁcally, ﬁrms with high sales compensate those ﬁrms with low
sales. The main contribution of this paper is showing how those practices can result
in successful collusion in this informationally-scarce environment. To induce ﬁrms to
set a collusive price, the equilibrium strategy has a ﬁrm make a payment to the other
ﬁrms for each unit that it reports having sold. To induce truthful reporting of sales,
the probability of cartel breakdown - reversion to a stage game Nash equilibrium
- is speciﬁed to be higher when total reported market sales is lower. Thus, a ﬁrm
that under-reports its sales realizes a beneﬁtb yh a v i n gt om a k eal o w e rp a y m e n tt o
the other ﬁrms, but also incurs a cost by increasing the probability that collusion
breaks down. In equilibrium, the cost of the increased likelihood of cartel breakdown
exceeds the beneﬁt from reduced inter-ﬁrm payments, so that a ﬁrm ﬁnds it optimal to
truthfully report its sales. In the special case when market demand is zero, one or two
19units, we characterized an optimal mechanism which has much the same properties
of this equilibrium. Observed collusive practices are then not only consistent with
equilibrium but also with an optimal mechanism for colluding. That various cartels
have responded in a similar manner to a problematic monitoring environment may
be due to them having identiﬁed optimal practices.
When the market involves intermediate goods - so that customers are industrial
buyers and thus price is private information between a buyer and a seller - our theory
suggests what antitrust authorities should look for in terms of collusive practices and
outcomes. First, ﬁrms exchanging sales reports. While this can occur in secret, it
can also occur through a trade association. Second, inter-ﬁrm sales or other forms of
compensation, as the use of asymmetric punishments is essential to eﬀective collusion
(a point originally made in Harrington and Skrzypacz, 2007). Third, periodic price
wars as it is the possible threat of a price war that induces ﬁrms to truthfully report
their sales. Thus, information exchange, inter-ﬁrm transfers, and periodic price wars
all add up to collusion.
207 Appendix A: Folk Theorems with Private Monitoring
and Communication
There is a growing literature on Folk Theorems in a repeated game when the history
of actions is not common knowledge. This literature can be partitioned into work
that allows players to communicate through cheap talk messages and work that does
not (an example of the latter is Hörner and Olszewski, 2006). As cartels did engage
in costless communication - and our equilibria will allow for it - we will limit our
attention to reviewing research on private monitoring with communication.26
Consider a repeated game in which, in each period, a player receives a private
signal of the actions selected by the other players in the previous period and then
players simultaneously choose actions. A player’s private history comprises her past
signals and actions; there is no public history. A player’s payoﬀ depends only on her
action and signal so, once observing the signal, the payoﬀ contains no information
about other players’ actions. Now, augment this structure by allowing players to
send costless messages. After observing their private signals and prior to choosing an
action, players simultaneously send messages that are publicly observed. Based on
these messages, monetary payments are allowed between players and, in some cases,
"burning money" is permitted (that is, net transfers are negative).
In developing a Folk Theorem, there are three primary issues that need to be
addressed: 1) Are the private signals suﬃcient to statistically detect cheating by a
player?; 2) How are players induced to truthfully reveal their private signals?; and
3) If punishments occur in equilibrium with positive probability, how is eﬃciency
achieved? In our brief survey, we will touch on how these issues are tackled by the
literature.
In a setting with three or more players, Kandori and Matsushima (1998) address
the ﬁrst issue by assuming that, for any pair of players, the remaining players’ private
signals can statistically determine which of those two players cheated. To deal with
the second issue, they use the trick of making a player’s net payment depend only
on the messages of the other players. Since a player’s net payment is independent of
her own message, she has a (weak) incentive to truthfully reveal her private signal.
Finally, eﬃciency is achieved as the scheme has players make pair-wise transfers so
there is no burning money in equilibrium (and no other form of punishment). All this
delivers a Folk Theorem. From our perspective of explaining cartel practices, there
are three weaknesses to this scheme. First, that a ﬁrm’s payment does not depend on
its own reported sales is inconsistent with documented collusive practices. Second,
the statistical detection assumption is strong and, in the oligopoly context, is unlikely
to be satisﬁed. For example, if ﬁrm 1 cheats by pricing low in a price game, ﬁrm 3
may be able to statistically detect that someone cheated - because ﬁrm 3’s quantity
is low - but will be unable to determine whether it was ﬁrm 1 or 2.27 Third, the
26For earlier reviews of this literature, see Kandori (2002) and Mailath and Samuelson (2006).
27They correctly note that if ﬁrms’ products are asymmetrically diﬀerentiated then their assump-
tion will be satisifed. But that is of value to explaining actual cartel practices only if the degree of
asymmetric diﬀerentiation is not trivial. As most price-ﬁxing cartels involve homogeneous commodi-
t i e s-s u c ha sc h e m i c a l s-t h e i ra s s u m p tion is not particularly palatable.
21mechanism requires at least three players.28
Compte (1998) assumes that a player can statistically detect cheating but does
not require statistical determination of who cheated; thus doing away with the strong
assumption of Kandori and Matsushima (1998). However, this is at the cost of re-
quiring that players’ signals are independent. Again, players make payments based
on reports though these transfers do not necessarily balance which means that money
is burned. This ineﬃciency is eliminated, however, by having players exchange infor-
mative messages with delay. As information is exchanged and money is burnt in the
distant future, the ineﬃciency disappears as the discount factor goes to one (and the
delay goes to inﬁnity). The assumption that players’ signals are independent limits
the usefulness of his scheme for modelling cartel behavior. In a price-setting oligopoly
game, a ﬁrm’s signal is its sales and one would expect ﬁrms’ sales to be positively
correlated due to common demand shocks.
Aoyagi (2002) considers a Bertrand price game where ﬁrms’ demands are aﬃliated
and their private signals are correlated. To get a Folk Theorem, he assumes ﬁrm
demand is discontinuous in price at the equilibrium price vector, while we assume
that demand is continuous in prices. His assumptions may be appropriate for cartels
operating in auction markets, but would not seem right for product markets such
as chemicals which is the motivation for our analysis. Furthermore, the structure
of equilibrium is rather unnatural. The equilibrium partitions the horizon into T
components - where component k is made up of periods k, T + k, 2T + k,...-a n d
a ﬁrm’s behavior is assumed to inﬂuence future behavior only within a component.
For example, if a ﬁrm prices low in period k and this produces low sales for the other
ﬁrms, the induced punishment is conﬁned to periods T + k, 2T + k,.... There is no
evidence this type of mechanism corresponds with actual collusive practices.
The recent work of Zheng (2008) and Obara (2009) have the most general as-
sumptions on players’ signals. Both studies are similar in their structure to that
of Compte (1998) but dispense with the requirement that players’ signals are inde-
pendent. When there is delay - that is, multiple private signals are received before
messages are sent - there is a tricky learning issue which must be circumvented. As
a player accumulates signals, she may update her beliefs about the signals received
by other players which will aﬀect her beliefs over the likelihood of a punishment.
Thus, the incentive to deviate can evolve and this can make it diﬃcult to construct
an equilibrium. Compte (1998) rules out such learning by assuming players’ signals
are independent. Zheng (2008) replaces independence with what he refers to as "ef-
fective independence" in that signals are allowed to be correlated but the equilibrium
is constructed so that the incentive compatibility constraint is unchanged as signals
are received. He adjusts the punishment by having the probability of going to the
stage game Nash equilibrium to depend in a precise way on reported messages. A
problem in applying Zheng (2008) to cartels is that he has a correlation condition
which can easily be violated in the oligopoly setting. For example, it does not hold
when market demand is not very volatile so that there is a low probability of all ﬁrms
28They also provide a diﬀerent scheme for when there are two players which is related to the work
of Compte (1998) which we review next.
22having a low level of sales.29 Also, the assumption that the vector of signals lies in a
product space, which is important for the equilibrium construction, is violated when
market demand is stochastically realized and then allocated among ﬁrms, as then the
sum of ﬁrms’ signals must be less than maximal market demand.
Obara (2009) also dispenses with the restriction that players’ signals are indepen-
dent. In its place, it is assumed that, for each player, there is at least one player that
can statistically detect a deviation by that player. Though this condition may be
plausible for some generic games, it may be hard to satisfy for a symmetric oligopoly
game. Furthermore, an unattractive feature to the equilibrium characterized is its
asymmetric structure in that diﬀerent players perform diﬀerent roles. For example,
in the two-player setting, player 1 provides a payment to player 2 which is based only
on player 1’s signal; thus, player 2 has a weak incentive to provide an informative
message. However, player 1 receives a payment based on both players’ signals. To
induce him to be truthful, there is a probabilistic punishment based on player 1’s
message. This ex ante asymmetric treatment of players does not ﬁtw e l lw i t hw h a t
we know about cartel behavior.





depends only on pair-wise price diﬀerences; this property
can be derived from a consumer choice model with quasi-linear preferences in money.










where 1n is a vector of ones of length n. Also, assume that the FOC is suﬃcient to




denote the corresponding vector specifying the probabilities over diﬀerent quantities
qi ∈ {0,...m} for player i.
Lemma 4 The equilibrium path-through of an increase in marginal costs to prices is
100%. That is, if all marginal costs increase by ∆, then the Nash equilibrium prices
increase by ∆.
Proof. Firm i’s best response problem to set price pN

















29Examining equation (6) from Zheng (2008), suppose y
0 i sal o wl e v e lo fs a l e s ,y is a modest level
of sales, and ai is a price below a
∗. Assume the probability that all ﬁrms have sales of y
0 is zero (or
close to zero); then the rhs expression is unbounded. In contrast, the lhs expression is bounded when
the probability that other ﬁrms have low sales - conditional on the low priced ﬁrm having modest
sales - is bounded above zero.















































where we used (21) to simplify. Hence, the FOC holds at these prices.
100% pass-through implies that pN (c)=c + const. Finally, note that the above
lemma holds even if costs are asymmetric: when ﬁrms have a vector of marginal costs
c then pN (c + ∆1n)=pN (c)+∆1n.
9A p p e n d i x C : P r o o f s
9.1 Proof of Theorem 1
In proving that the lysine strategy proﬁle is a semi-public perfect equilibrium, we
need to establish: i) given any history of reports and payments, the prescribed price
is optimal; ii) given any history of reports and payments and, for the current period,
a ﬁrm’s price and sales, the prescribed report is optimal; and iii) given any history of
reports and payments (including the sales reports of ﬁrms in the current period), the
prescribed payment is optimal. We will tackle them in that sequence with the bulk
of the analysis concerning the incentive compatibility of sales reports, which is step
(ii). When the public history has one or more ﬁrms not submitting reports or one or
more ﬁrms not making payments, the optimality of behavior is obvious because the
industry is to be in the non-collusive phase. Our attention will then focus on public
histories on the equilibrium path, which means ﬁrms are in the collusive phase and
all ﬁrms submitted reports and made the appropriate payments.
By symmetry, let us restrict the analysis to ﬁrm 1. Given a generic price vector
p and the anticipation that truthful reports will be submitted and transfers will be





















V is the value when in the collusive phase and V N is the value when in the non-
collusive phase. Note that a ﬁrm with sales q expects to pay zq, while receiving an
24equal share of the payments made by the other n − 1 ﬁrms which equal z (m − q).






























Thus, if the collusive price is b p then the incentive compatibility constraint (ICC) at
























ψ1 (q;m,p1, b p,...,b p)
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; that is, b p is the static Nash equilibrium
























is continuously increasing and unbounded in z by A4, then










Taking account of the fact that transfers average out to zero, expected collusive
proﬁti s
















‘The collusive value is recursively deﬁned by:





φ(m)δV N +( 1− φ(m))δV
¤
.
The incremental gain from being in the collusive phase is





φ(m)δV N +( 1− φ(m))δV
¤
− b π (0) − δV N.
Solving for V − V N,
V −V N =
b π (z) − b π(0)





















This expression will be useful later in the proof.
25The next step is to consider the optimality of a ﬁrm’s strategy at the report stage.
If in the collusive phase then ﬁrm 1’s beliefs put unit mass on other ﬁrms setting a
price equal to b p. Firm 1’s strategy is sequentially rational if the prescribed report is
optimal given the other ﬁrms’ current period price was b p, any arbitrary price for ﬁrm






denotes ﬁrm 1’s posterior beliefs on total demand con-
ditional on its quantity and the price vector. Given the other ﬁrms are expected to
provide a truthful report and make payments, ﬁrm 1’s expected payoﬀ from reporting
r1 (when its true sales is q1)i s 31






























(m − q1 − (n − 1)r1)
¸
+φ(m − q1 + r1)δV N +( 1− φ(m − q1 + r1))δV}.
The ICCs are:
W (q1;q1,p 1) ≥ W (r1;q1,,p 1) ∀r1 ∈ {0,1,...}, ∀q1 ∈ {0,1,...,q}, ∀p1. (25)
These ICCs ensure that, for any price set by ﬁrm 1 and any realized sales for ﬁrm 1,
ﬁrm 1 ﬁnds it optimal to truthfully report its sales. That statement presumes that
ﬁrm 1 will make a payment of zr1 regardless of what r1 is, which we will later show
to be optimal.
Our analysis proceeds through several steps. First, we derive a condition ensuring
that it is not optimal to over-report sales; that is, r1 = q1 is preferred to any r1 >q 1.
In deriving a condition ensuring that it is not optimal to under-report - that is,
r1 = q1 is preferred to any r1 <q 1 -w eﬁrst derive a condition whereby if it is not
optimal to under-report by one unit then it is not optimal to under-report by any
amount. Then we derive a condition whereby if it is not optimal to under-report
by one unit when q1 = q (so a ﬁrm’s sales are at its maximum level) then it is not
optimal to under-report by one unit when q1 < q. We are then left with the property:
if
W (q;q,p1) ≥ W (q − 1;q,p1), ∀p1, (26)
then all under-reporting ICCs at the report stage are satisﬁed. Theorem 1 is derived
by examining (26) as δ → 1. As we’ll see, its satisfaction requires imposing certain
properties on φ.
30These conditions are suﬃcient but not necessary for semi-perfect public equilibrium. It is possible
there is a deviant price after which reporting truthfully is not a best response, but that deviant
price (along with the optimal report) is less proﬁtable than setting the collusive price and reporting
truthfully.
31Though semi-public perfect equilibrium only requires that the ICC holds when other ﬁrms are
believed to price at e p, we will allow for any price vector in order to reduce the amount of notation.
26Let us start by deriving a condition which ensures that ﬁrm 1 prefers to provide






























(m − q1 − (n − 1)r1)
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(m − q1 − (n − 1)r1 − m + nq1)
δ
¡















z (q1 − r1)
δ
¡







[φ(m − q1 + r1) − φ(m)] ≥ z (q1 − r1). (28)
Interpreting (28), the rhs is the change in transfer from reporting r1 instead of q1.A s
z>0 and r1 >q 1, it is negative. The lhs is the expected change in the future payoﬀ
due to over-reporting. It captures the impact of an over-report on the probability
of transiting to the non-collusive phase. Equilibrium requires that the change in the
expected future payoﬀ is at least as great as the reduction in the current payoﬀ from
making a higher payment. As the rhs of (28) is negative, a suﬃcient condition for
(28) to hold is then:
δ
¡







[φ(m − q1 + r1) − φ(m)] ≥ 0. (29)
We will return to this condition later in the proof.
Next, consider the case of under-reporting. The ICCs are
W (q1;q1,p 1) ≥ W (r1;q1,p 1) ∀r1 ∈ {0,1,...,q 1 − 1}, ∀q1 ∈ {0,1,...,q}, ∀p1.
(30)














(m − q1 − (n − 1)r1)
¸
(31)
















(m − q1 − (n − 1)(r1 − 1))
¸














(m − q1 − (n − 1)r1) − φ(m − q1 + r1)δ
¡












(m − q1 − (n − 1)(r1 − 1)) − φ(m − q1 + r1 − 1)δ
¡








[φ(m − q1 + r1 − 1) − φ(m − q1 + r1)]δ
¡





















[φ(m − q1 + r1 − 1) − φ(m − q1 + r1)]δ
¡
V − V N¢
≥ z. (32)
By under-reporting by one unit, ﬁrm 1 reduces its payment by z, which is the rhs of
(32). The lhs is the expected change in the future payoﬀ from under-reporting.
What we want to show is that if (32) holds for r1 = q1 then it holds ∀r1 <q 1,
and this is true ∀q1 ≤ q. This is indeed the case if
φ(m − q1 + r1 − 1) − φ(m − q1 + r1)
is non-increasing in r1 ∀r1 ≤ q1, ∀q1 ≤ q; or, equivalently, φ(m − 1) − φ(m) is
non-increasing in m ∀m ≤ m. From hereon, this property is assumed for φ.
Having derived a suﬃcient condition on φ whereby if a ﬁrm doesn’t want to under-
report by one unit then it doesn’t want to under-report by any amount, the next step
is to derive a suﬃcient condition such that if it is not optimal to under-report by one
unit given q1 = q0, then it is not optimal to under-report by one unit given q1 = q0−1.








[φ(m − 1) − φ(m)] ≥
z
δ (V − V N)
. (33)






¯ ¯q0 − 1,p
¢
[φ(m − 1) − φ(m)] ≥
z
δ (V − V N)
. (34)






¯ ¯q0 − 1,p
¢








[φ(m − 1) − φ(m)].
(35)













, which is true by A3.
To summarize, if φ(m − 1) − φ(m) is non-increasing in m ∀m ≤ m then (30)
holds iﬀ W (q;q,p1) ≥ W (q − 1;q,p1) or
δ
¡







[φ(m − 1) − φ(m)] ≥ z. (36)
Substituting (24) into (36), we have
δ
Ã £
b p − pN (c)
¤
(μ/n)











[φ(m − 1) − φ(m)] ≥ z (37)
Summarizing the proof of Theorem 1 thus far, if the ICCs for the payment stage
are satisﬁed (which is shown later) then the lysine strategy proﬁle is a semi-public









; ii) φ(m − 1) − φ(m) is non-
increasing in m ∀m ≤ m; iii) (29) holds; and iv) (37) holds. We now want to impose








where β>0 and ω ∈ (0,1); see Figure 1. With this speciﬁcation, φ is decreasing in
m for m ≤ m, equals zero for m = m, and is positive and constant for m>m.N o t e
that (ii) is then satisﬁed. Since limδ→1 φ(m)=0for m ≤ m then the equilibrium
probability of a punishment goes to zero. As we will suppose δ → 1,φ(m) is assured
of lying in [0,1),a sl o n ga sβ is bounded.
Inserting (38) into (37), we get
δ
Ã £
b p − pN (c)
¤
(μ/n)
1 − δ + δ
Pm









β (1 − δ) ≥ z.





b p − pN (c)
¢









b p − pN (c)
¢
>n z(m − μ) (40)
then (39) is satisﬁed if β is suﬃciently large. Let us show that (40) is equivalent to









, we can solve for the per unit transfer z required



























exists by A4. Substituting (41) into (40) and re-arranging gives us (1). In sum,
if (1) holds and φ satisﬁes (38)-(39) then all of the under-reporting ICCs hold.
This leaves us just having to show (iii). This we will do by showing that (29)
holds as δ → 1. Using (38) and assuming r1 >q 1,t h el h so f( 2 9 )i s
δ
¡





















































Using (24) and (38), we substitute for V − V N in (42),
= δ
Ã £
b p − pN (c)
¤
(μ/n)
1 − δ + δ
Pm





























Letting δ → 1,t h eﬁrst term in {·} is bounded, while the second term is unbounded
and positive since ω − 1 < 0 implies limδ→1 (1 − δ)
ω−1 =+ ∞.( I ti sh e r ew h e r ew e
30use A2.) Hence, as δ → 1 then the expression in {·} is positive. Thus, (iii) holds as
δ → 1.
The ﬁnal step in proving the lysine strategy proﬁle is a semi-public perfect equi-
librium is to show that the prescribed behavior for the payment stage is optimal.
First note that reporting zero and following the equilibrium strategy (which entails
a zero payment) is at least as good as any positive sales report and not making the
corresponding payment; for the latter results in a punishment for sure while the for-
mer could have a punishment with probability less than one. Since we’ve already
shown that reporting truthfully is weakly preferred to reporting zero and following
the equilibrium strategy (obviously, the two reports are identical when realized sales
is zero), it follows that a ﬁrm never ﬁnds it optimal to submit a report and then not
make the corresponding payment.32
In sum, if (1) holds then, by choosing δ suﬃciently close to one, the lysine strat-
egy proﬁle is a semi-public perfect equilibrium. Finally, for any ε>0,w h e nδ is
suﬃciently close to one,
max{φ(m):m ≤ m ≤ m} = β (m − m)(1− δ) <ε ,
so the probability of a price war in any given period can be made arbitrarily small.
9.2 Proof of Theorem 3
The way in which we will proceed is to consider a less constrained problem with a
strict subset of the ICC and feasibility constraints. Once the mechanism is charac-
terized, we’ll show that the remaining ICC and feasibility constraints are satisﬁed.
Speciﬁcally, we seek to maximize
max
|t(r1,r2)|≤x





[t(2,0) + 2t(1,1) + t(0,2)]
+
µ













subject to these constraints:
t(2,0) ≥ t(1,0) (45)
t(2,0) ≥ t(0,0) (46)
ηt(1,1) + (1 − η)t(1,0) ≥ ηt(0,1) + (1 − η)t(0,0) (47)
0 ≥ t(0,2) + t(2,0) (48)
0 ≥ t(1,1) (49)
32It can also be shown that, if ﬁrms are suﬃciently patient and reports are bounded, it is always
optimal to pay zr after reporting r. Since monitoring is perfect, the usual argument works.
310 ≥ t(0,1) + t(1,0) (50)
0 ≥ t(0,0) (51)
(45)-(47) are the ICCs ensuring that a ﬁrm does not want to under-report its sales.
η ≡ η1,1 (p,p) so that (47) is (17) when evaluated at equilibrium prices. (48)-(51) are
the feasibility constraints for when aggregate sales reports do not exceed 2.
The problem is then to choose t(0,0),t(1,0),t(0,1),t(2,0),t(1,1), and t(0,2)
to maximize (44) subject to (45)-(51). Note that (44) is increasing in t(1,1) and that
t(1,1) enters only (47) and (49). A higher value increases the maximand and loosens
(47). Hence, (49) must be binding. Optimality then requires:
t(1,1) = 0. (52)
Next note that (44) is increasing in t(0,2) and that t(0,2) enters only (48). If
x>t(0,2) then optimality requires (48) to bind:
t(2,0) + t(0,2) = 0. (53)
If x = t(0,2) then, by (48), it follows that t(2,0) = −x. Again, t(2,0) + t(0,2) = 0.
Optimality then requires (53).
Using (52)-(53), deﬁning s = t(0,2) = −t(2,0), and simplifying, we can re-state
(44) as choosing t(0,0),t(1,0),t(0,1), and s (all in [−x,x]) to maximize:
µ
2(1− ρ0) − ρ1
4ξ0 (0)
¶
+ ρ0t(0,0) + ρ1t(0,1) + ρ2s (54)
subject to
−s ≥ t(1,0) (55)
−s ≥ t(0,0) (56)
(1 − η)t(1,0) ≥ ηt(0,1) + (1 − η)t(0,0) (57)
0 ≥ t(0,1) + t(1,0) (58)
0 ≥ t(0,0) (59)
Suppose (57) was not binding:
(1 − η)t(1,0) >η t(0,1) + (1 − η)t(0,0).
Even if (58) is binding, we can raise t(0,1) and lower t(1,0) (note that (55) will still
be satisﬁed) so as to satisfy (58) and, because (54) is increasing in t(0,1), the payoﬀ
is higher. The only caveat to the preceding argument is if t(0,1) = x, in which case
t(0,1) cannot be increased. But then, by (58), it follows that t(1,0) = −x. In that
case, (57) takes the form:
(1 − η)t(1,0) ≥ ηt(0,1) + (1 − η)t(0,0) ⇔





32which is a contradiction since t(0,0) ≥− x. Hence, (57) must be binding:
(1 − η)t(1,0) = ηt(0,1) + (1 − η)t(0,0) ⇔






where, using Bayes Rule,
η =
ρ2ψ(1;2)
ρ2ψ(1;2) + ρ1ψ (1;1)
=
ρ2 (1/2)





Using (60) to substitute for t(1,0) in (54), the problem is now to choose t(0,0),t(0,1),
and s to maximize:
µ
2(1− ρ0) − ρ1
4ξ0 (0)
¶
+ ρ0t(0,0) + ρ1t(0,1) + ρ2s (61)
subject to






−s ≥ t(0,0) (63)






0 ≥ t(0,0) (65)
If an optimum has s<0 then, since (61) is increasing in s,i tm u s tb et h ec a s e
that (62) and/or (63) are binding. By (65), if (63) binds then s ≥ 0 which is a














which violates (64). Therefore, it cannot be the case that s<0. We conclude that
an optimum must have s ≥ 0.
Suppose 0 >t(0,1). Since (61) is increasing in t(0,1) then one of the constraints
must bind. It follows from 0 >t (0,1) and (65) that (64) does not bind. When
0 >t(0,1), (63) binds before (62) which implies (62) does not bind. Thus, neither of
the constraints involving t(0,1) bind which means (61) can be increased by raising
t(0,1). We conclude that t(0,1) ≥ 0 at an optimum.
33To summarize the properties of an optimum derived thus far:









t(0,2) = −t(2,0) = s ≥ 0.
t(0,1) ≥ 0 implies that if (64) holds then (65) holds which makes (65) redundant;
and if (62) holds then (63) holds which makes (63) redundant. The problem is then:
choose s, t(0,0), and t(0,1) to maximize
µ
2(1− ρ0) − ρ1
4ξ0 (0)
¶
+ ρ0t(0,0) + ρ1t(0,1) + ρ2s
subject to












where (62) has been rearranged. First note that it is not an optimum for t(0,1)−s>
0. In that case, (67) implies (66) is not binding. Since t(0,1) >simplies s<x , s can
be increased which raises the objective while continuing to satisfy the constraints.
Therefore, t(0,1)−s ≤ 0. Hence, if (66) holds then (67) holds, and, at an optimum,
s ≥ t(0,1).
Thus, the problem is: choose s, t(0,0), and t(0,1) to maximize
µ
2(1− ρ0) − ρ1
4ξ0 (0)
¶
+ ρ0t(0,0) + ρ1t(0,1) + ρ2s
subject to






s ≥ t(0,1) ≥ 0
0 ≥ t(0,0)
By including the constraint s ≥ t(0,1), we ensure that satisfaction of (66) implies (67)
holds. Suppose the ﬁrst constraint does not bind at the optimum. As the objective
is increasing in s, it must be the case that s = x. Hence, the constraint becomes:






34but this cannot hold since t(0,0) ≥− x and t(0,1) ≥ 0. We conclude that the
constraint binds:






Therefore, the problem is: choose s, t(0,0), and t(0,1) to maximize
µ
2(1− ρ0) − ρ1
4ξ0 (0)
¶
+ ρ0t(0,0) + ρ1t(0,1) + ρ2s (68)
subject to






s ≥ t(0,1) ≥ 0 (70)
0 ≥ t(0,0) (71)
• Assume ρ2 >ρ 0,ρ 1.
Suppose t(0,0) > −x. Since we’ve shown that, at an optimum, t(0,1) ≥ 0 then
x>sby (69). But the objective can be increased by raising s by ε>0 (which is
possible since s<x ) and lowering t(0,0) by ε.T h eo b j e c t i v eg o e su pb y(ρ2 − ρ0)ε>
0 and, in addition, (69) still holds. Therefore, t(0,0) = −x.
We now have that, at an optimum, t(0,0) = −x and we previously showed
s,t(0,1) ≥ 0. (69) is now






Use this condition to substitute for s in (68):
µ
2(1− ρ0) − ρ1
4ξ0 (0)
¶











2(1− ρ0) − ρ1
4ξ0 (0)
¶








Substituting for s in (70), we get











The problem is then: choose t(0,1) to maximize
µ
2(1− ρ0) − ρ1
4ξ0 (0)
¶












x ≥ t(0,1). (73)
35Since ρ2 >ρ 1 then (72) is decreasing in t(0,1). By the derived condition that
t(0,1) ≥ 0, an optimum has t(0,1) = 0. (Also note that since t(0,0) = −x and
s ≤ x,( 6 9 )w o u l db ev i o l a t e di ft(0,1) < 0.) From t(0,0) = −x and t(0,1) = 0, it
follows from (69) that s = x.
If ρ2 >ρ 0,ρ 1 then the solution is
t(0,0) = −x
t(0,1) = 0,t(1,0) = −x
t(0,2) = x,t(2,0) = −x
t(1,1) = 0
and the objective takes the value:
µ
2(1− ρ0) − ρ1
4ξ0 (0)
¶
+ ρ0t(0,0) + ρ1t(0,1) + ρ2s
=
µ
2(1− ρ0) − ρ1
4ξ0 (0)
¶
+( ρ2 − ρ0)x
To complete the analysis, we need to ensure that the remaining ICC and feasi-
bility constraints are satisﬁed. For that purpose, we extend the transfer function to
encompass sales reports that sum to more than two.
t(0,0) = −x (74)
t(0,1) = 0,t(1,0) = −x,
t(0,2) = x,t(2,0) = −x
t(1,1) = 0
t(r1,r 2)=−x if r1 + r2 > 2
Notice that all feasibility constraints are satisﬁed.
Referring back to the complete set of ICCs, the ones that we still need to verify
are satisﬁed are, for all p1,33
η1,1 (p1, b p)t(1,1) +
¡
1 − η1,1 (p1, b p)
¢
t(1,0) (75)
≥ η1,1 (p1, b p)t(2,1) +
¡
1 − η1,1 (p1, b p)
¢
t(2,0)
η1,1 (p1, b p)t(1,1) +
¡
1 − η1,1 (p1, b p)
¢
t(1,0) (76)
≥ η1,1 (p1, b p)t(0,1) +
¡
1 − η1,1 (p1, b p)
¢
t(0,0)
η0,2 (p1, b p)t(0,2) + η0,1 (p1, b p)t(0,1) (77)
+
¡
1 − η0,2 (p1, b p) − η0,1 (p1, b p)
¢
t(0,0)
≥ η0,2 (p1, b p)t(1,2) + η0,1 (p1, b p)t(1,1)
+
¡
1 − η0,2 (p1, b p) − η0,1 (p1, b p)
¢
t(1,0)
33A c t u a l l y ,w eh a v ea l r e a d yv e r i ﬁed that (76) holds for p1 = e p.
36η0,2 (p1, b p)t(0,2) + η0,1 (p1, b p)t(0,1) (78)
+
¡
1 − η0,2 (p1, b p) − η0,1 (p1, b p)
¢
t(0,0)
≥ η0,2 (p1, b p)t(2,2) + η0,1 (p1, b p)t(2,1)
+
¡
1 − η0,2 (p1, b p) − η0,1 (p1, b p)
¢
t(2,0)
Substituting (74) into (75),
−
¡
1 − η1,1 (p1, b p)
¢
x ≥− η1,1 (p1, b p)x −
¡
1 − η1,1 (p1, b p)
¢
x ⇔ η1,1 (p1, b p) ≥ 0,
which holds. Next consider (76):
−
¡








η0,2 (p1, b p)x−
¡
1 − η0,2 (p1, b p) − η0,1 (p1, b p)
¢
x ≥− η0,2 (p1, b p)x−
¡
1 − η0,2 (p1, b p) − η0,1 (p1, b p)
¢
x ⇔
η0,2 (p1, b p) ≥− η0,2 (p1, b p).
Finally, consider (78):
η0,2 (p1, b p)x −
¡
1 − η0,2 (p1, b p) − η0,1 (p1, b p)
¢
x ≥− x ⇔ 2η0,2 (p1, b p)+η0,1 (p1, b p) ≥ 0.
We conclude that if ρ2 >ρ 0,ρ 1 then (74) is an optimal mechanism.
• Assume ρ0 >ρ 1,ρ 2.
Return to (68) with constraints (69)-(71). Suppose t(0,0) = 0. Since we’ve al-
ready shown that, at an optimum, s,t(0,1) ≥ 0, then (69) implies s =0=t(0,1).
Let us see if there is a better solution. Thus, suppose t(0,0) < 0. t(0,0) < 0 and (69)
imply t(0,1) > 0 and/or s>0. If t(0,1) > 0 then (70) implies s>0. Hence, at an
optimum, if t(0,0) < 0 then s>0. If (70) is not binding - speciﬁcally, if s>t(0,1) -
then (68) can be increased by reducing s by ε and raising t(0,0) by ε; the objective
goes up by (ρ0 − ρ2)ε>0 a n d( 6 9 )s t i l lh o l d s . G i v e nt h e nt h a ts = t(0,1),t h e
problem is to choose t(0,0) and s to maximize
µ
2(1− ρ0) − ρ1
4ξ0 (0)
¶








Substituting this constraint into the objective, the problem is to choose t(0,0) and
s to maximize µ
2(1− ρ0) − ρ1
4ξ0 (0)
¶













37Since ρ1 − ρ0 < 0 then (79) is decreasing in s. Given (80), t(0,0) should be set as
high as possible, which implies t(0,0) = 0 and, therefore, s =0 . T h eb e s ts o l u t i o ni s
then:
t(0,0) = 0,t(0,1) = 0,t(1,0) = 0,t(0,2) = 0,t(2,0) = 0,t(1,1) = 0.
Hence, if ρ0 >ρ 1,ρ 2 then no collusion can be sustained.
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